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Executive Summary
“Growth should pay for growth.” This slogan—the common justification for development 
charges—is rarely challenged in municipal circles. The principle that those who cause new urban 
growth should pay for the infrastructure associated with it has generally been taken for granted, 
at least for the last few decades. Development charges evolved from post-1945 subdivision 
agreements and were initially accepted by most developers as a mechanism for enhancing the 
likelihood that current residents in a municipality would agree to new development. They now 
add as much as $90,000 to the cost of a new house in some parts of the Greater Toronto Area. 
If we are serious about attempting to lower the cost of housing in our prosperous cities, it is 
time to consider reverting to the past practice of having municipalities pay for the cost of new 
infrastructure associated with development. Such a policy—still largely in place in metropolitan 
Montreal—would lead to increased levels of municipal borrowing and modest increases in 
property taxes in some places. This report explores the origins of development charges in the 
United States and Canada, examines how they have been assessed in the academic literature, 
and looks at some of the alternatives as experienced in other countries. Prescriptions for future 
policy are cautious because other countries seem to be increasingly adopting similar charges and 
reducing them where they exist in Canada could lead to injustice for recent home buyers and 




1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 5
2. Why Do We Have Development Charges? ................................................................................................. 5
3. Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Development Charges? ................................................................ 7
4. Development Charges: Solving Policy Problems or Politically Convenient?  .......................................8
5. Shaky Justifications ................................................................................................................................. 10
Growth-Related Benefits are not Fully Localized and Separable ......................................10
Economic and Institutional Context Matters ..................................................................11
Housing Affordability vs. Suboptimal Service Provision ...................................................13
Average-Cost Calculation and the Fiction of the Cost-Benefit Nexus .............................13
Inequitable Treatment of Greenfield vs. Inner-City Infrastructure ....................................14
6. What Happens Elsewhere? ....................................................................................................................... 15





“Growth should pay for growth.” This slogan—the common justification for development 
charges—is rarely challenged in municipal circles. There are certainly debates about how to 
calculate the charges, how high they should be, and whether they should vary depending on 
location within a municipality. But the principle that those who cause new urban growth should 
pay for the infrastructure associated with it has generally been taken for granted, at least for the 
last few decades. This report explores the origins of development charges, examines how they 
have been assessed in the academic literature, and looks at some of the alternatives as experienced 
in other countries. In Britain, there have long been debates about a “betterment levy,” the 
attempt to tax the windfall gains accrued by landowners when they obtain planning approval for 
new projects. In what ways, if any, is the “growth should pay for growth” policy some form of 
substitute for a betterment levy? The answer hinges in large measure on who actually pays the 
cost of development charges, a subject also to be addressed. 
Housing affordability is a major problem in the densely populated parts of southern 
Ontario. In 2018, $2.23 billion were collected in development charges by municipalities 
throughout the province (Ontario, 2021). As we shall see, the revenue from these charges is 
focused almost exclusively in fast-growing regions, especially the Greater Toronto Area. In 
2020 as much as $93,000 in some parts of the Regional Municipality of Halton was added to 
the cost of a new house by development charges levied by municipal governments and school 
boards (Oakville, 2020a). This report suggests that we reexamine the reasoning that has led 
to such an outcome. As Slack and Bird wrote thirty years ago, “the more closely one looks at 
the development-charge approach to financing municipal infrastructure, the less attractive it 
becomes” (1991, 1303–04).
 The ultimate objective of the report is to urge policymakers in Ontario to examine 
critically some of the wider issues about development charges. Hopefully, it will also be relevant 
in other Canadian provinces (see Baumeister, 2012), especially British Columbia, where these 
charges are significant contributors to the high cost of new housing.
2. Why Do We Have Development Charges?
Development charges are an outgrowth of subdivision agreements, which became popular in 
North America in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Housing was in great demand, but 
municipal finances were still recovering from the Great Depression. Instead of building roads, 
sewers, and watermains to service new areas themselves, municipalities entered into agreements 
with developers whereby the developers built the infrastructure within the subdivision according 
to municipal standards and then turned it over to the municipality when all the building was 
complete. By the 1960s these agreements required developers to pay some municipal costs 
outside the subdivision. In Ontario, these payments went by various names including “lot levies,” 
6
“cash imposts,” and “development charges” (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003). In the United 
States they were normally known as “exactions.” While they were supposed to be based on 
demonstrated infrastructure needs related to the new development, they could easily degenerate 
into a mechanism whereby developers extracted municipal planning permission by making cash 
payments. This sketchy process often benefited both sides, but obviously led to great uncertainty, 
and even to claims in some places that some developers got better deals from a particular 
municipality than others. Pressure mounted for state and local regulation that would legitimize 
and standardize the collection of lot levies and exactions.
Standardized fees for off-site development first appeared in the United States in the mid-
1980s and were generally called “impact fees”. Their implementation provoked considerable legal 
conf lict that has been well documented. One study described the political environment for the 
adoption of impact fees in these words: 
Existing taxpayers in many jurisdictions have grown unwilling to share the cost of 
providing services to new residential development through property taxes that secure 
general obligation debt. They see little reason for paying the way of newcomers, 
especially when tax levies appear to rise without a commensurate increase in service 
levels. It is understandable, then, that the passage of several tax cutting measures, 
including California’s Proposition 13 and Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½, has attracted 
national attention as a possible way of reconciling inf lation-eroded state and local budgets 
and reducing the scope of government and government supported services. (Bauman and 
Ethier, 1987: 51)
This same study noted that in many places new residential development was expected “to pay its 
own way” through impact fees. The authors claim that the fees are “a condition of residency” 
and that proponents of the fees often fail to consider the potential benefits of growth experienced 
by all residents which “include growth in retail sales and sales tax collection, expanded 
employment opportunities, increased disposable income, and diversity in housing choices” 
(Bauman and Ethier, 1987: 51–52).
It is important to note that, in the United States, impact fees emerged during the Reagan 
years at a time of “taxpayer revolt.” Their emergence was more an indication of desperation 
and weakness than it was of innovative policy-making that resulted from newly acquired 
political strength. The claim that new development provides long-term benefits to everyone 
is an important one that will brief ly be considered later in this report. For now, it is sufficient 
to note that, unlike many American municipalities, Canadian municipalities that approve new 
development do not reap the benefits from a growth in sales tax collection.
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3. Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Development Charges?
Empirical determination of the incidence of development charges—who ultimately bears their 
burden—is exceptionally difficult to undertake because of difficulties in untangling the various 
relevant factors (land prices, property-tax levels, construction costs, overall state of the real-estate 
market, etc.). An early Canadian study published in the University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 
argued that the ultimate burden falls on the original owners of undeveloped “greenfield” land: 
Economic theory predicts that the cost of exactions will be absorbed eventually by 
the factors most inelastically supplied to the production of new housing. The supply of 
land is generally regarded as price inelastic and consequently farmers, speculators and 
other holders of undeveloped real estate will be the principal losers as a result of harsh 
municipal exaction practices. (Hudec, 1980: 116)
The author goes on to suggest that development charges are a form of betterment levy. Such 
a claim was rare in North America over the subsequent forty years but has been much more 
important in the United Kingdom.
A more common argument is that development charges are passed onto purchasers of 
new housing (Blais, 2010: 97–100). Stegman (1987: 5) writes that “[W]hen most communities 
in a market adopt roughly equivalent impact fees, the developers’ costs will likely be passed 
on in the form of higher prices or rents [thereby] significantly diminish[ing] the affordability 
of housing.” He then claims that “this is only half the story.” As new and existing housing are 
located within the same regional housing market, higher rents and prices for new housing due to 
impact fees have the knock-on effect of increasing those of existing housing. Stegman highlights 
the difficult position of renters in such a situation:
The higher prices at which established homeowners can sell their houses will compensate 
them for higher prices they may have to pay for houses in the same market. Renters, 
on the other hand, receive no such capital gains. Their higher rents are, in effect, an 
uncompensated burden that stems from the private financing of infrastructure to serve 
new residents. That current renters, who do not create a need for new infrastructure, 
indirectly bear some of the costs of its financing is an important equity issue that merits 
serious attention by local policy makers. (Stegman, 1987: 5)
Writing in 1991 following the passage of Ontario’s Development Charges Act of 
1989, Enid Slack and Richard Bird addressed many of the same issues that Stegman looked at. 
They compared development charges in Ontario and British Columbia (where they are called 
“development cost charges”) and, like Stegman, agreed that new homebuyers usually paid 
the cost, especially in circumstances where development charges were relatively equal across 
municipalities and where there was a strong demand for new housing, as in the Toronto and 
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Vancouver metropolitan areas. They also agreed that these charges often benefit the interests 
of existing residents in a municipality (Slack and Bird, 1991). A 1997 study of the incidence of 
development charges (exactions) in different parts of Contra Costa County in the San Francisco 
Bay Area showed that new homeowners absorbed the cost where real-estate markets were 
booming, while landowners and developers did so in sluggish or declining markets (Dresch and 
Shiffrin, 1997). In 1998, John Yinger claimed to have proven, using formal economic modelling, 
that about a quarter of the cost of development charges would normally be paid by the original 
landowners, i.e., farmers and/or land speculators (Yinger, 1998: 37). In a footnote, Yinger states 
that “The owners of the land at the time the development fees are announced are the ones who 
bear the [landowners’] burden” (38). Yinger’s overall conclusion is worth quoting for the larger 
purposes of this report: “...development fees confer a small capital gain on existing homeowners 
and, to the extent housing construction is competitive, do not place any burden on developers. 
No wonder development fees are so popular” (37). 
Yinger further acknowledges that “The buyers of new homes will indeed bear some of 
the burden of these fees as the benefits of infrastructure show up in the price they pay for new 
housing” (1998: 37). This is certainly the conventional wisdom in Canada: development charges 
drive up housing prices. The main circumstance in which this would not be true would be if 
there were two neighbouring and growing municipalities, one of which levied development 
charges and the other did not. To offer competitively priced housing in the jurisdiction with 
development charges, either the original landowner or the developer or both would have to 
absorb the cost. In the real world, including in the Greater Toronto Area, such a circumstance is 
unlikely to exist (because there is no reason for neighbouring growing municipalities to forego 
maximum-level development charges), so the costs of development charges get passed on to the 
new homeowners. There is also agreement with Yinger’s conclusion that the increased prices 
caused by the development charges also marginally increase the prices even of older homes 
(Amborski, 2011: 27).
4. Development Charges: Solving Policy 
Problems or Politically Convenient? 
Over the last decade debates about development charges have become quite contentious, 
especially in Ontario, where development charges in some areas are the highest in North 
America (Amborski, 2015: 6). Municipalities rely on the “growth should pay for growth” 
argument to defend a much-needed and lucrative source of revenue (Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario, 2019). Environmentalists generally embrace development charges 
because they at least have the potential to put a price on urban sprawl (Blais, 2010), thereby 
possibly encouraging denser infill development closer to the centre. Both of these arguments 
portray development charges as a tool for advancing important policy objectives. They are 
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countered by pro-development groups (Amborski, 2011) and authors writing for the CD Howe 
Institute (e.g., Dachis, 2018) who blame development charges for adding to high housing costs. 
Another view, especially prevalent in the American context, is that these charges are a 
politically convenient device to enable growth to occur. Altshuler and Gómez-Ibáñez (1993: 139) 
claim that development charges “merit recognition as an ingenious local adaptation to antitax 
and antigrowth pressures—highly imperfect, subject to abuse, and requiring state oversight, 
but often highly preferable to the likely alternatives.” They suggest that, in the absence of such 
charges, the antigrowth and antitax pressures will lead to higher housing costs (due to a lack 
of new supply) and/or a deterioration in the quality of local infrastructure (due to a lack of 
investment). Similar points were made in 2013 by British researchers who were commenting on 
impact fees in the United States:
In some communities, impact fees are actually considered a pro-growth tool because of 
their ability to defuse anti-growth lobbies or NIMBYism and thus increase the likelihood 
that the development will be approved. In addition, because they are typically used as 
a replacement for negotiated exactions, impact fees add speed and predictability to the 
development process. (Monk et al., 2013: 92)
In other words, development charges, in the American context anyway, are seen as a “least bad” 
practical adaptation that prevents no-growth politics from taking over. What is quite remarkable, 
however, is that no one in the US seems to have attempted a more theoretical or comprehensive 
justification, i.e., one that emphasizes development charges as a means to achieving wider policy 
objectives.
The well-known urban economist William Fischel sees development charges as simply 
being the result of bargaining between developers and municipalities, which he conceptualizes 
as clubs of current property-owners. If developers thought the charges were too high, they 
would not build or would build in jurisdictions without development charges (Fischel, 2001: 6). 
In other words, he sees these charges in roughly the same way as Altshuler and Gómez-Ibáñez 
(1993): as a mechanism for buying the support of current property-owners for new growth. 
Fischel observes that development charges “are controversial not because they charge too little, 
but typically because they charge more than the development seems to add to the municipality’s 
fiscal costs” (67). He goes on to note that state legislation and court decisions serve to rein in the 
more egregious abuses (as they are supposed to do in Ontario). 
The Canadian economist Adam Found (2019) makes a policy-based argument that 
is seemingly divorced from politically convenience. For Found, the basic problem is that 
infrastructure spending is “lumpy.” Big projects and facilities cannot be built incrementally. 
They are instead oversized at the start in order to accommodate future growth. He argues that 
development charges are necessary because current taxpayers cannot be expected to foot the 
bill today for benefits that (mostly) other people will enjoy in the future. For Found it is thus a 
matter of equity—“growth” households should pay for their own “lumpy” requirements. It is 
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therefore perhaps ironic that these same households pay the full cost of their share of the new 
infrastructure before they even move in. The fact that most will borrow the funds through 
their mortgages, and therefore pay back the cost of passed-on infrastructure charges over time, 
does not alter the fact that municipalities are receiving the funds even before the supposed 
beneficiaries are benefiting. Municipalities are also divesting themselves of the small financial 
risk that results from paying for excess capacity in infrastructure that might not be needed in the 
future if projected growth does not materialize. Instead, individual homeowners absorb this risk 
in the form of their mortgage debt repayment obligation.
5. Shaky Justifications
To recap, defenders of development charges as good policy assume that growth-related costs 
for infrastructure are clearly separable from non-growth-related costs. The benefits of urban 
development and redevelopment are understood to be highly localized. Existing residents 
are assumed to receive limited benefits from growth in the regional housing market and the 
infrastructure constructed to accommodate it; these are understood to be almost completely 
captured by new residents. Even if there are generalized benefits from growth, potential 
opposition to paying for it from existing residents justifies transferring the costs to new residents. 
Finally, environmentalists argue that putting a price on greenfield development incentivizes 
densification of existing areas through infill and redevelopment. On these bases, “growth should 
pay for growth.” These arguments break down in the real world for several reasons. 
Growth-Related Benefits are not Fully Localized and Separable
Found (2019) argues that existing residents cannot be expected to pay for new infrastructure 
that is oversized in anticipation of future growth. The problem with this line of argument is 
that all capital spending is “lumpy” to some degree, even in municipalities that are growing 
very slowly. Surely no one would advocate building any sort of new facility that did not have an 
element of excess capacity. In any event, excess capacity is not inherently bad or wasteful; rather, 
it benefits new and existing residents alike. It enhances the experience of using the infrastructure 
and provides for more f lexibility both for the operators of the infrastructure and the consumers. 
Wider roads; new public-transit facilities and vehicles; and new libraries, recreational facilities, 
and fire stations all provide some benefit to some existing residents as soon as they are built, 
even if growth was the main cause of such investments. More generally, the expansion of the 
metropolitan housing and labour market ultimately benefits everyone by providing new business 
opportunities, local jobs, and potential agglomeration economies even if, as in Canada, local 
municipalities do not directly benefit from any new non-property-tax revenues. If this were not 
the case, we would not expect municipalities of any size—even those with high development 
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charges that apply to residential and commercial and industrial properties—to have some version 
of an economic development office committed to attracting new growth and investment.
The fact that there are pervasive and ongoing disputes about how to calculate 
development charges indicates that growth- and non-growth-related expenditures are not 
clearly separable; if they were, there would be no controversy. In fact, the initial oversizing of 
infrastructure and facilities is an excellent argument for municipal borrowing. If the term of the 
bond issued matches the anticipated lifespan of the asset constructed, all future residents who 
directly or indirectly benefit from it will pay for it incrementally, through property tax revenue 
and user fees that are put to debt-servicing costs. For municipalities, development charges pull 
the costs of future use of infrastructure and facilities into the present instead of spreading them 
out over time. At the same time, they transfer financial risk to the new homeowners.
Economic and Institutional Context Matters
Found (2019) and other defenders of development charges accept the claim made by Altshuler 
and Gómez-Ibáñez (1993) and others that, if everyone is expected to pay for new growth-related 
infrastructure, existing residents would mobilize to oppose it to avoid paying higher property 
taxes. This would lead either to a shortage of housing (which could benefit some existing 
residents by raising the value of their houses) and/or an undersupply of local infrastructure 
for the whole community (which would ultimately lower the value of all buildings in the 
municipality). As I will show, such reasoning might well make sense in small American 
residential suburbs, but politically effective no-growth pressure in the much larger and more 
economically vibrant municipalities around Toronto seems unlikely. Moreover, unlike in many 
American jurisdictions, Canadians do not hold referendums on the issuing of debt or property 
tax limitations. Indeed, direct democracy is the principal means by which existing residents resist 
growth in the United States.
Development charges can be imposed in a wide variety of economic and institutional 
contexts. At one extreme are slow-growing small towns and cities outside larger metropolitan 
areas. In such places, municipal politicians and residents are anxious to attract growth and 
are generally willing to pay the accompanying infrastructure costs, if any. In these places it is 
highly likely that development charges will be very low or nonexistent. At the other extreme 
are suburban, largely residential municipalities that still have considerable vacant land, and are 
located within fast-growing metropolitan areas. Here, developers are anxious to build, but 
existing residents are reluctant to pay for the additional municipal infrastructure that is required 
to accommodate them. Somewhere between these extremes are growing metropolitan areas with 
one dominant municipality that itself has considerable vacant land ripe for development. 
Much of the academic literature about development charges comes from the United 
States. In the American context it is important to remember that most metropolitan areas (except 
in the southwest) contain a great many relatively small residential suburban municipalities. 
12
Here, in the absence of impact fees, we are likely to see exceptionally strong resistance to new 
development. Such development provokes classic NIMBY (“Not In My Back Yard”) responses, 
as homeowners resist the loss of empty space and fear various forms of congestion and other 
unknown changes in their daily lives. To avoid congestion, however, new infrastructure is 
required, even though the existing property tax base is limited. 
In hot real estate markets, by contrast, developers have every incentive to contribute to 
the costs of the required new infrastructure in order to participate in market expansion. The 
authors of the most sophisticated American analysis of exactions and impact fees (Altshuler and 
Gómez-Ibáñez, 1993) claim that it is in these circumstances where such fees are most justified. 
In their absence, the municipal council, prodded by its nervous and cost-conscious residents, 
is most likely to reject new growth. Exactions and impact fees might not be ideal, but they are 
better than restricting growth, driving up housing prices through lack of supply, or causing leap-
frogging urban sprawl even further out from the centre of the metropolitan area. 
In Canada, except in Montreal, Vancouver, and Victoria, we do not have such small and 
independent suburban municipalities. In the Greater Toronto Area, where growth pressures 
are the most intense, we have a provincial government that lays down growth targets, regional 
governments with substantial infrastructure responsibilities, and within them, restructured 
lower-tier municipalities that are very populous and territorially large (especially Mississauga, 
Brampton, Markham, and Vaughan), at least by American suburban standards (Urbaniak, 
2009: 238). These are precisely the places in Canada where we find the highest development 
charges.  It is a similar situation in large municipalities that are dominant in their own particular 
metropolitan area, and therefore are near-monopoly competitors in their regional housing 
markets—e.g., Ottawa, Hamilton, London, Barrie, Calgary, Winnipeg, and Halifax. It is my 
contention that, in these institutional circumstances, growth is going to happen regardless of 
whether there are development charges. The issue is simply how the new infrastructure is to be 
paid for. 
Slack and Bird (1991: 1304) sum up what happens in such an institutional environment:
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that in an important sense what is really going on is the 
substitution of private for public borrowing. Canadian municipalities, particularly in 
Ontario, are generally run in a fiscally conservative fashion, partly by choice and partly 
in response to strong provincial controls on local borrowing. The traditional case for 
borrowing for local public capital facilities is not accepted, and municipalities tend to 
pay for everything out of current revenues (including, of course, provincial grants) to the 
extent possible. One consequence of this policy is the increasing reliance on development 
charges discussed in this paper: in effect, public sector borrowing is replaced by private 
sector borrowing (by developers and/or new-home buyers). This substitution seems 
unlikely to be economically efficient, however, given the greater riskiness and generally 
higher transactions costs of private sector borrowing. 
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In a growing housing market in which most or all municipalities impose development charges, 
they amount to the transfer of infrastructure financing from stingy municipalities to the private 
sector. This increases housing costs because lenders charge property developers higher interest 
rates than governments pay bondholders. Shifting infrastructure costs from borrowing to 
development charges in turn enables municipalities to confer a benefit on existing property 
owners in the form of lower property taxes (Fathers, 2014).
Housing Affordability vs. Suboptimal Service Provision
Found (2019) counters the claim that development charges increase housing costs by arguing 
that there is effectively a trade-off between optimizing the level of service provision and 
housing affordability. The purchaser of a house is buying not just the house but also a bundle of 
municipal services, an argument implied in Yinger’s (1998) analysis. In effect, homebuyers will 
get what they pay for. In the absence of development charges, Found suggests that the level of 
municipal services will be suboptimal. However, the decrease in the value of future municipal 
services (which the new homeowner is paying for through property taxes anyway) could not 
possibly be as much as the cost of the high current development charges in such places as the 
Greater Toronto Area, which significantly increase the value of new housing.
Average-Cost Calculation and the Fiction of the Cost-Benefit Nexus
Defenders of development charges frame them as a form of user charge. Developers are charged 
for the growth-related development charges that they cause to occur. We have seen that 
development charges grew out of the ad hoc arrangements between developers and municipalities 
to have developers pay for an assortment of off-site infrastructure costs that appeared to be caused 
by new development. In their ideal form, these arrangements were closely linked to real costs. In 
their less ideal form, they were a mechanism whereby developers purchased planning permission. 
The creation of a standardized system of development charges eliminated the obvious arbitrary 
features of the old arrangements.
But standardization created its own problems. Development charges for large 
houses in greenfield developments were the same as for a new small house in an established 
neighbourhood. This led to claims that development charges based on average costs, rather than 
marginal costs (i.e., different charges for different types of development) served to promote urban 
sprawl (Slack, 1994; Blais, 2010). This problem has been partially corrected by creating different 
categories of development charges depending on the nature of the new development, but the 
underlying problem remains (Tomalty and Skaburskis, 2003): some new buildings pay less than 
the costs of the new infrastructure they are assumed to create, and others pay more.
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It is common for taxpayers to help finance public services they do not use. We all pay 
for municipal parks and recreation services, even if we have a swimming pool in our backyard 
and never use a public park. The problem with development charges is that they exist as a result 
of allegedly precise calculations about particular costs that new buildings create. But when they 
are actually collected, there is little or no effort to assign the charges based on what is being 
consumed. If we go to an all-you-can-eat buffet restaurant, we expect everyone to pay the same 
amount regardless of our appetite. But, if we order à la carte, we don’t expect to split the bill 
equally with a neighbouring table.
Inequitable Treatment of Greenfield vs. Inner-City Infrastructure
We have already seen that the value of older properties is likely to be increased by the fact 
that development charges make houses and commercial properties in newer areas within the 
same housing market more expensive. But a further inequity occurs in a municipality that 
contains within its boundaries both centrally located older buildings and peripherally located 
newer development. In the older parts of town, the original local infrastructure would have 
been installed and paid for by the municipality. In new greenfield development, the developers 
build and pay for the local infrastructure and they pay development charges, most of the costs 
of which usually gets passed on to the new homeowner. But when a municipality rebuilds 
sewers, water pipes, and roads in the old part of town, property owners throughout the 
municipality—including those new homeowners who have just absorbed local infrastructure 
costs and development charges as part of the price of their new building—share these capital 
costs through their property taxes. In fact, infrastructure upgrading and replacement in built-up 
areas, which is required due to obsolescence or breakdown as much as through infill growth, is 
often more expensive than in the tabula rasa of greenfield areas. In older areas, nearby property 
owners pay nothing extra, and often they are living in the most established and desirable 
neighbourhoods. Established residents would loudly object if they were to be levied a special 
charge for “redevelopment.” Meanwhile, new residents in greenfield developments can object to 
their financial burdens only by not buying or by buying in an older neighbourhood. But, if all 
potential new residents in a growing community acted in this latter way, housing prices in old 
neighbourhoods would soon skyrocket.
Another way in which established homeowners are privileged over purchasers of new 
homes is that new houses in Canada are subject to the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) or 
the federal-provincial Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). In Ontario, the charge for HST is 13 per 
cent. As development charges are passed on to homebuyers in the cost of the new house in hot 
markets, this means that purchasers are even paying HST on the cost of development charges. 
It is true that these purchasers in Ontario can apply for federal and provincial rebates on HST, 
but the maximum rebate is $30,300. However, HST payable on a new home costing $800,000 is 
$104,000.  An Ontario service that counsels people on applying for the rebate points out that: 
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In an effort to lower the “sticker price” of a newly constructed condo or house, the 
builder or developer will often incorporate the rebate into the listed price of a new 
home or condo. In this scenario, the rights to the proceeds of the new housing rebate 
are transferred to the developer upon signing the purchase agreement, and in exchange, 
they deduct the HST rebate amount from the purchase price. Essentially, the vendor is 
lending the buyer money knowing they will be paid back when the buyer’s HST new 
housing refund is issued. This scenario is very commonplace since it lowers the purchase 
price for the buyer, and relieves them from the headache of having to file for the refund 
themselves. (HST Rebate New Homes Services, 2021)
Finally, as already noted, environmentalists sometimes argue that development charges 
put a price on sprawl by (in principle) eliminating subsidy of greenfield growth-related 
infrastructure by existing urban areas. The problem with this argument in the Ontario context is 
that development charges on new buildings are typically applied in infill and greenfield contexts 
alike, conferring little or no advantage on infill development in established areas. Moreover, one 
could argue that if municipalities borrowed the full cost of greenfield infrastructure, they would 
have a strong incentive to plan denser neighbourhoods require less linear infrastructure (Burchell 
et al., 2005).
6. What Happens Elsewhere?
How is growth-related infrastructure financed in the absence of development charges? For 
municipal practitioners in places where development charges are high, the prospect of their 
not existing might seem impossible to imagine. But there are places where they do not exist. 
Pointing to municipalities in the same province that have low, or no, development charges is not 
likely to be helpful, because such municipalities are usually in areas suffering from population 
decline and no development. We need to know more about how local infrastructure is financed 
in jurisdictions that are experiencing significant growth but that do not have development 
charges. Montreal and its suburbs are one such place, but it seems impossible to assess the merits 
of such a system because there is very little available documentation in either English or French 
(Polèse, 2020). A survey prepared by consultants for the Building and Land Development 
Industry (BILD) in Toronto in 2019 showed that the average “infrastructure charge” for new 
“low-rise” buildings in Montreal, Laval, and Longueuil was only $1,462 (Altus Group Economic 
Consulting, 2019: 17). Housing in Greater Montreal is generally cheaper than in other major 
Canadian cities, municipal borrowing levels are higher, and there is evidence of more municipal 
corruption (Saint-Martin, 2015). This last factor may or may not be related to the absence of 
significant development charges. Without development charges, developers who receive building 
permission assume less financial risk as they launch their projects. In this sense, the municipal 
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permission is more valuable than if it was conditional on the payment of development charges, 
and therefore the possible returns from corrupt practices might be higher. 
Looking beyond North America, things get more difficult. Philip A. Booth, a retired 
academic at the University of Sheffield, is one of the more perceptive students of comparative 
urban planning. He emphasizes the difficulty of comparing planning practices across nations 
because of the differing laws, cultures, and practices that are so deeply embedded within each 
country’s systems that the experts in those systems are often incapable of explaining their key 
components to outsiders. Nevertheless, if we do not at least make some effort to understand what 
happens elsewhere, we shall be unable to understand fully our own systems. In comparing local 
infrastructure financing schemes in Britain and France, he says nothing about “growth paying 
for growth.” He claims that both schemes are really about “land value capture” or “planning 
gain” (Booth, 2012). 
The British government—especially when controlled by the Labour Party—has had a 
long history of trying to capture “planning gain” through some form of betterment levy (Crook, 
2016). The idea here is that the value of land greatly increases when permission is granted by a 
local authority to build on that land. Why should the landowner profit from this increased value 
when it has been created by public action? Taxing “planning gain” has been the objective but it 
has been difficult to achieve, primarily because landowners tended to respond by withholding 
land from development, especially during times when the Conservative opposition promised 
to repeal the tax when they returned to office. The concept of planning gain has been more 
salient in Britain than in North America because each new building in Britain requires specific 
planning permission. There is no “right to build” that derives from zoning because zoning does 
not exist. “Upzoning” in North America certainly creates a form of “planning gain” but there 
have been no serious efforts to tax it, although developers of large projects often agree to provide 
enhanced local amenities as a form of compensation (Moore, 2016).
Since 1968, British local authorities have been authorized to enter into “planning 
agreements” with developers (Booth, 2012: 18). Such agreements could require developers to 
build infrastructure and to make cash payments to help defray the costs of new infrastructure 
that is external to the development. Significantly, however, by 2011–12 “over 60%” of the 
total value of these agreements was going towards “affordable housing” (Rowley and Crook, 
2016: 161), so in this sense they are quite unlike North American subdivision agreements and 
development charges. Since 2008, local authorities could also charge developers a Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) based on the square footage of each new house being built. 
Crook and Whitehead (2019: 368) have estimated that all developer contributions in 
England in 2016–17 added, on average, about £40,000 to the cost of each new home expressed 
in the 2007–08 value of pounds sterling. This is a high number, but it is not directly comparable 
to the costs of Canadian development charges because it includes all in-kind contributions (i.e., 
developer-built infrastructure). What is curious about the British experience is that there seems 
to have been virtually no academic studies of the incidence of the costs of the various forms of 
planning obligations. A 2017 study of the incidence of such obligations in Australia claimed that 
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in the UK there was “anecdotal evidence only claiming the required infrastructure contributions 
for one case study development would add £38,000 per dwelling. It is suggested that this dearth 
of research has been due to a lack of publicly available data, as experienced in the UK and 
Australian research efforts to date” (Bryant, 2017: 562).
Booth (2012: 84) writes that, “Recent work on the use of [planning] obligations for 
affordable housing demonstrates that at least part of the effect is to lower land prices, although 
it is also evident that the burden is partly shared with the developer.” Rowley and Crook (2016: 
164) acknowledge that it is possible that “purchasers of completed developments pay in higher 
prices” but they claim that by analyzing a select number of cases about which they were able 
to obtain data, that the costs were generally absorbed, in varying ratios, by the developers and 
original landowners, but not by the consumers. The consumers of “affordable housing” clearly 
are the beneficiaries of English planning obligations. What is not so clear is why, according to 
academic commentators at least, consumers of full-cost new private housing are apparently not 
sharing the burden. 
On the surface it certainly appears that Britain, after moving away from outright taxes on 
“planning gain,” has been edging towards the North American model of subdivision agreements 
and development charges. But the fact that CIL levels are generally low (and charged on the basis 
of the size of new houses) and that much of their value is directed towards providing “affordable 
housing” means that the differences between Britain and North America are still substantial.
In both the Netherlands and France, municipalities were very active in suburban land 
development until about the 1990s. They purchased rural land at its agricultural price, provided 
infrastructure and then sold the building lots to private developers at a price that covered the 
cost of the infrastructure (Monk and Crook, 2016: 248). Starting at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, however, private developers started to buy rural land on speculation. They then agreed 
to pay for, or provide, local infrastructure in return for permission to develop the land, thereby 
creating a system that looks similar to that in Britain.
What is different in France is that private developers since 2012 are now subject to 
two nation-wide taxes (taxation d’aménagement and VSD) that are designed to pay for the local 
infrastructure required by new housing (Monk et al., 2013: 59). The rates of the taxes are set by 
the communes and they reap most of the benefits. English researchers have offered the following 
observation: 
These financial incentives have been found to have a positive effect on residents’ views on 
development…. This is because in France, communes are small enough and close enough 
that residents can see the taxation being spent on local facilities. This has not been 
observed in England, possibly because local authorities are large and the fruits of any 
developer payments are too remote to produce the same effect. (Monk et al., 2013: 59)
In Germany, the designation of land for residential development is tightly regulated, 
mainly by municipalities acting within wider national and regional plans. But municipalities 
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also play a crucial role in providing the infrastructure required for new development. Monk and 
Crook (2016: 234) describe the German arrangements in these words:
While a developer acquires the building site, it is the responsibility of the municipality 
to service the land and provide the infrastructure (streets and parking areas, technical 
services, green space and also ‘social infrastructure’ such as playgrounds). This puts 
municipalities in a strong position to inf luence common facilities and to recoup the 
related costs. The applicant for a building permit on such a site is required to contribute 
to those costs, to a maximum of 90%, with the remaining costs (at least 10%) paid by the 
municipality…. Special local laws are used by municipalities to vary the level of charges 
for landowners…. The actual provision of the infrastructure is commissioned by the 
municipality. In addition, the owner must pay the costs of measures to compensate for 
any destruction of nature and landscape caused by the development…. However, if the 
municipality demands too much, land will not be brought onto the market. There are 
also a range of loans, subsidies and cheap building land available for constructing both 
owner-occupied and rented housing, which are targeted at households with a limited 
income….
 It is important to reiterate Booth’s observations about the difficulties involved in 
attempting to apply particular practices observed in one country as a remedy for perceived 
problems in another. Given the differences in municipal arrangements between most parts of 
the United States and Canada, it is even dangerous for Canadians to draw too many conclusions 
from American practices with respect to development charges. Alternatives are available. Those 
who question the wisdom of high development charges should at least be aware that other 
western countries seem to be moving in the direction of applying charges for new growth that 
look similar to Ontario’s development charges.
Municipal observers in the Toronto and Vancouver areas should know that growth-
related infrastructure in the Montreal area is still largely financed through municipal borrowing 
that is paid back by revenue from property tax paid by all property-owners in the municipality. 
This is presumably why Quebec municipalities are the most indebted in Canada (Meloche and 
Vaillancourt, 2021: 16). In any event, an urgent Canadian research priority is to obtain a better 
understanding of how new development happens in Quebec, especially in suburban Montreal. 
For now, all we can do is speculate about what municipal finances would look like in Ontario if 
its municipalities followed the Quebec model.  
7. Is There Life Without Development Charges?
Could Canadian municipalities get along financially without development charges? For most, 
the answer is obviously yes because most do not levy such charges. But what about the ones that 
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do? This is not so easy to answer, mainly because of accounting issues. “Development charges” 
are not an item in municipal operating budgets because these charges relate to the separate capital 
budget, the structures of which vary a great deal from one municipality to another. Development 
charges, however, do appear as an annual revenue item in audited municipal financial statements 
because these statements combine operating and capital revenues and expenditures in accordance 
with the principles of accrual accounting.
 For Ontario, these financial statements are reported by the province through its 
collection of municipal financial information returns (FIRs). The FIRs for all of Ontario in 
2018 show that municipalities collected $2.23 billion in development charges while $21.8 billion 
was collected in property tax. Revenue from development charges is obviously important for 
municipalities.  The alternative to raising infrastructure funds from development charges is 
for municipalities to borrow. This is where things get difficult. Different municipalities have 
widely different borrowing practices for capital funds. However, if development charges were 
to be reduced or eliminated, borrowing practices would have to change for many, and perhaps 
provincial legislation would need to be amended. In August of 2020 the City of Toronto sold 
twenty-year bonds at an annual interest rate of 2.15 per cent and an “all-in cost” of 2.218 per 
cent (Toronto, 2020). If we assume that the $2.23 billion collected by Ontario municipalities in 
2018 were replaced by funds borrowed over twenty years at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent, the 
annual amortization cost would be $142 million, which would result in an average property tax 
increase over the whole province of 0.7 per cent. Interest rates can obviously go up or down, 
most likely up, given the current low rates. If the worry is the potential increase in municipal 
capital borrowing rates, we should have similar concerns about the exposure of new homebuyers 
to increased mortgage rates (which are higher than municipal borrowing rates) and monthly 
payments, a substantial portion of which often goes to paying the cost of development charges. 
A significant difference between municipal borrowing and homeowner mortgages is that for 
the former the rate is locked in for the duration of the loan, while for the latter rates are usually 
guaranteed only for a maximum of five years. Many Canadian homebuyers have variable-rate 
mortgages. Borrowing is less risky for municipalities than for homebuyers for these reasons. It 
is also true, however, that in the absence of development charges municipalities would have to 
borrow every year for different projects and might find that debt servicing costs would increase 
over time as interest rates for new bonds rise. 
 We have already seen that the highest development charges in Canada are in the suburbs 
around Toronto, with Halton Region having the highest charges of all. Combining development 
charge revenues from the Regional Municipality of Halton and its four constituent lower-tier 
municipalities in 2018 (Ontario, 2021), we find that the total amount raised was $258 million 
(excluding development charges from school boards, which, in 2020, added about $8,000 in 
charges for each new single-family house [Oakville, 2020b]). Total property tax revenue was 
$896 million (Ontario, 2021). If the $258 million were financed at 2.5 per cent over 20 years, the 
annual amortization payment would be $16.4 million, which translates into an average property 
tax increase of 1.8 per cent across the Region.
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8. Conclusion
Development charges were invented to facilitate development. They improve economic 
efficiency to the extent that they remove the incentive from current residents to block 
development solely on the grounds that they do not want to pay for new infrastructure. As 
we have seen, this is much more likely to have been a problem in small American suburban 
municipalities in fast-growing metropolitan areas than it is anywhere else, including the Greater 
Toronto Area. The most important questions relating to development charges are who actually 
pays them and whether the arrangements are fair.
There is some evidence that at least part of the cost of development charges in some 
places in some circumstances is paid by the owners of agricultural land before it is scheduled 
for development. To the extent that this is the case, development charges are a truly excellent 
form of tax because they capture what the British call “planning gain”—the windfall increase 
in property value that occurs when rural lands are upzoned for urban use. Unfortunately, most 
observers agree, especially in North America, that residential development charges are actually 
passed on to the owners (or renters) of new homes in newly developed areas. Proponents of the 
slogan “growth should pay for growth” are in support of this outcome because they believe that 
growth-related infrastructure costs can be fairly separated from other local infrastructure costs 
and that current residents have no moral responsibility for such costs. Much of this report has 
been devoted to showing the shortcomings of such a view.
The report began by pointing to the very high development charges in some parts of 
Canada (but not Québec), especially in the Toronto suburbs. Given that housing affordability 
is now a huge issue in Canada’s metropolitan areas, it seems reasonable to think that by 
reducing, or eliminating, development charges, we could help reduce housing costs. Eliminating 
development charges, however, would likely be unfair to recent purchasers of new homes who 
are still paying for the charges through their mortgage payments. A possible undesirable outcome 
might be that prices for new homes would not come down because developers and/or landowners 
would reap the benefits by not passing the “savings” along to new buyers. Furthermore, some 
municipalities would face significant disruptions to their plans for future capital financing and 
would undoubtedly be concerned about more long-term borrowing even though, at current 
interest rates, such borrowing would not have dire consequences for property-tax bills.
Given all these factors and the fact that other countries facing similar pressures to 
facilitate infrastructure financing in fast-growing areas have also effectively levied taxes on new 
development that look somewhat like development charges, the wisest course of action would 
probably be to freeze them at current levels and plan for their gradual reduction over time, 
perhaps to be eroded only by inf lation. During this period of reassessment, we might want to 
consider whether or how development charges could be used, as they are in Britain, to enhance 
the availability of “affordable housing.” Calling for a freeze and reassessment is not a dramatic 
solution, but it does recognize that it was easier to stumble into development charges than it is to 
get out of them; that there is still a lot that we do not know about their effects; and that policy 
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reversals can have unintended consequences, so it is sometimes better to stick with what we 
know. 
From a practical policy perspective, this conclusion must seem disappointing. But for 
those of us who try to understand the political economy of municipal financing, there is an 
important lesson to be learned from this account of the evolution of development charges: rather 
than being grounded in any theoretical account of “economic efficiency,” development charges 
have always been a pragmatic political response to a particular set of problems relating to the 
financing of local infrastructure in fast-growing urban areas. As generally structured in Canada, 
they do not act to contain urban sprawl because the charges are usually based on average costs 
rather than marginal costs, and they apply to infill as well as greenfield development. They 
almost certainly add unfairly to the cost of housing in a way that harms the interests of first-time 
homebuyers, leading to other policy “patches,” such as governments subsidizing down payments. 
They seem to work in practice only because so few established interests object to them. But they 
do not work in theory, and this should be of concern to everybody, not just academics. New 
entrants to housing markets are not an established interest. Someone must speak for them.
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